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INTRODUCTION
For the past 50 years environmental recovery and protection of
English and Welsh rivers has been aided by a group of single-
minded, selfishly-motivated private fishermen, assisted by a co-
operative organisation operating on a shoestring budget and using
the common law as its main tool. Their actions are taken in the Civil
Courts and pre-date the environmental movement by 25 years.
This paper analyses the work of the Anglers' Conservation Asso-
ciation (ACA) in fighting pollution, and so provides an illustration of
the legal process. Since its formation in 1948 as a private interest,
self-help group, the ACA has quietly, consistently and successfully
fought to improve and maintain good quality rivers in England and
Wales. Its legal actions have established important precedents in
environmental protection. It has helped to form policy by providing
advice to both Houses of Parliament. The ACA's Director is cur-
rently serving on a Government Committee to try to solve the huge
problem of pollution caused by flooding in disused coal mines.
The basis of its legal actions is very simple. In the common law
landowners have certain benefits and duties, called riparian rights,
over water flowing across or alongside their land. They cannot own
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the water, but they can use a "reasonable" amount of it and they have
the right to a sufficient quality and quantity of water flowing past.
Their duties are to ensure that the rights of neighbouring riparian
owners are not damaged by their own actions. Furthermore, if the
riparian owner has a fishery, he also has the right that migratory fish
have free passage up and down the river, from their spawning
grounds to the sea.
Adherence to these simple-sounding principles in common law
has, in the words of a former Under-Secretary of State for the Envi-
ronment, Mr Eldon-Griffiths, "been one of the main defences - and
sometimes the only defence - against river pollution." 3 Nevertheless,
during the lifetime of the ACA there have been three attempts to
abolish the civil rights of riparian owners through statutory legisla-
tion. Fortunately, the ACA and their members mounted successful
campaigns to alert MPs, officials and the media and the rights have
remained intact.4
In the ACA's history are incidents where a polluting public water
authority was successfully sued by a private individual; where an
angling club stopped pollution of an estuary 40 miles downstream of
the club itself; and where ACA lobbying dissuaded government from
handing a licence to pollute to large industries. Although they rarely
make news headlines ACA action is extremely important. As in all
forms of law most of its potential cases are settled by negotiation
before they reach the courts - a process that yields little publicity to
or recognition for the ACA as a preventer of pollution.
The ACA is probably the most efficient pollution-preventing body
in Britain.5 This paper details how it has achieved such success and
why its experience demonstrates the error of the idea that individuals
either cannot or will not protect the environment.
1. Sturges v. Bridgeman, llCh.D. 852, 865 (1879)
2. See generally, ARTHUR WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND
WATERCOURSES (1979).
3. Report for 1972, 19 THE ANGLERS' CONSERVATION
ASSOCIATION REVIEW No. 3 at 21 (1973) [hereinafter ACA REVIEW].
The ACA Review is published by the Angler's Conservation all of
the volumes cited here are on file with the author.
4. See generally, ROGER BATE, SAVING OUR STREAMS (2000).
5. See generally, C. STRATrON GERRISH, POLLUTION: THE ACA
HANDBOOK (5th ed. ACA Press 1973).
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1. The Anglers' Conservation Association and the common law
The ACA will often enter into friendly negotiation with polluters
and recover damages of a few hundred or a few thousand pounds,
but in each case, the money represents realistic reparation for dam-
age done and, significantly, it goes to the anglers who use it to make
good what was lost.
Such reparation seems normal today since public opinion puts a
high value on environmental protection but after the Second World
War things were very different. The public mood was for economic
development, regeneration of industry, building new homes, provid-
ing consumer goods and generally making up for the privations of a
long and dreary war. Pollution was an occupational hazard of little
significance to most people, but it was during this time that the first
riparian action against pollution since the 19th century was brought.
6
THE EARLY DAYS OF ACA
Sewage pollution was a significant cause of fish kill in the 1940s
and it was fitting that the ACA began following an action brought by
Lord Brockett.
Lord Brocket, a lawyer and MP a sought remedy for sewage pollu-
tion in the common law as a riparian owner. The common law of
England, as it developed over many centuries, allowed the owner of
land adjoining a river or watercourse the entitlement to protect it
from pollution and excess abstraction.
7
If a riparian owner's water is polluted by a proprietor higher up-
stream, he has a good cause of action against the polluter. The reme-
6. PETER CARTY & STEVEN PAYNE, ANGLING AND THE LAW
(1998).
7. This entitlement is known as a riparian right. Lord Wensley-
dale in Chasemore v. Richards summarised the law in 1859 as fol-
lows:
[The landowner] has the right to have [water] come to
him in its natural state, in flow, quantity, and quality, and
to go from him without obstruction; upon the same prin-
ciple that he is entitled to the support of his neighbour's
soil for his own in its natural state. 7 H.L. Cas. 349, 382
(1859).
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dies available to a sufferer or plaintiff if his case is proven are com-
pensation for loss suffered and the granting of an injunction to re-
strain any possible future pollution from the same defendant in the
action.
The riparian owner also has a right to the ordinary use of the water
flowing past his land, that is, to take as much water as is reasonably
accepted. However there is no simple, standard definition of ordi-
nary abstraction. Each case is considered on its own merits, the rule
being that extraordinary abstraction that reduces the flow of water is
in principle actionable by a lower riparian owner.
8
Furthermore, the ownership rights are so strong that it was estab-
lished in 18679 that if a person wished to exercise a riparian right, for
instance to stop pollution, it was only necessary for him to own a
tiny fraction of the bank of the stream.
Nevertheless, exercising the law is expensive for individuals and
the personal risk is high, because if he loses his case, the plaintiff is
liable for all costs - his own and the defendant's. Naturally, this
works the other way too, the loser pays for everything. Since the
government had made severe pollution which caused a public nui-
sance a criminal offence in 1876, it was generally assumed that the
owners' rights had been superseded, so the use of civil law to bring
actions against polluters had all but disappeared in the twentieth cen-
tury.
Lord Brocket claimed that his rights had been infringed and that
the effluent from the Luton Corporation's sewage works'o had mate-
rially altered the natural state of his water. As a riparian owner, he
did not even have to prove that he had suffered damage, only that his
water had been affected. A writ was issued and the case of Lord
Brocket v. Luton Corporation came before Judge Vaisey in 1946.' 1
8. See WISDOM, supra note 2, at 104. There are several cases
which have influenced this position: Miner v. Gilmour, 12 Moo.
P.C.C. 131 (1859); Earl of Norbury v. Kitchin, 7, L.T. 685 (1863);
McCartney v. Londonderry Ry. Co., [1904] A.C. 301 (1904); White
& Sons v. White, 1906, A.C. 72 (1904).
9. Crossley v. Lightowler, 16 L.T.R. 438 (1867)
10. The Luton Corporation is somewhat misleadingly named since
it was a local government body.
11. See Progress Against Pollution, 1 ACA REVIEW No. 1, 10
(1950). Most of the ACA cases referred to in this paper were never
reported in Law Journals. Transcripts were kept for up to seven years
[VOL. XlV
SAVING OUR STREAMS
He listened to the evidence, which had been prepared by the embry-
onic ACA team of solicitor, barrister and expert witnesses who gave
evidence of their analyses. The sewage works was found liable for
polluting the River Lea in Hertfordshire. An injunction was granted
and the defendants were also ordered to pay the costs of the action.
In retaining the ACA team, Lord Brocket had given them the per-
fect test of how well their idea would work. For the team the case
was "a try-out against determined opposition and proved its effi-
ciency in action.'' 2 It showed that it was possible for the ACA to
brave conflict or controversy to achieve its goal. It also epitomised
many of the cases encountered later - local authorities disregarding
common law rights, effluent quality objectives that were useless at
preventing pollution, and the lack of dilution for effluents being ig-
nored.
THE FOUNDER
The idea that anglers shall group together to finance actions
against polluters in the common law came from one man - an an-
gling barrister and Bow Street magistrate. John Eastwood OBE, KC
analysed the sixteen Acts of Parliament in force in the mid-1940s for
the protection of rivers and decided "that none of them was any
good."' 13 He saw that the quality of water in a river was highly de-
pendent on how water in that river was used. For example, good
salmon fishing could be found on rivers like the Test, which sup-
ported little industrial activity, while industrial production near riv-
ers like the Derwent and Trent meant that water quality was far
poorer. According to Eastwood, there was apparently no real effort
to stop any polluter from releasing effluent into those British rivers
used to support industrial activity. Any statutory action on these in-
dustrial rivers had been either ineffectual or even damaging.
but for most of the cases discussed in this paper original research
uncovered transcripts or the author relied upon the ACA's own re-
porting.
12. Id.
13. Pollution Talk on BBC, 4 ACA REVIEw No. I at 65 (1953).
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LEGISLATION TO 1948 - THE LAW AND THE REMEDY
The Public Health Act of 1875 made the first attempt to deal with
pollution from sewage and gas works, and the Rivers Pollution Pre-
vention Acts (1876-1893) gave local authorities power to take
criminal proceedings against polluters. Prior to that, the owner of a
river, or of the land adjoining the river, was the only person entitled
to protect it from pollution.'
4
The Attorney General could take criminal proceedings only if pol-
lution was so gross as to constitute a public health danger - a public
nuisance. A public nuisance is an act unwarranted by law or an
omission to discharge a legal duty which materially affects the life,
health, property, morals or reasonable comfort of a class of citizens,
who come within the sphere or neighbourhood of its operation.'
5
This Rivers Pollution Prevention Act (1876) attempted to alleviate
the expense of private action. However, according to C. Stratton
Gerrish, the legal consultant to the ACA from 1950 to 1970, the Act
failed because local authorities were only enabled to take action to
stop pollution and not obliged to do so. What is more the prosecutor
under the Act was usually the polluter itself (a local authority) or
another local authority. In the case of industrial pollution, the con-
sent for an action had to be given by the Minister of Health, who
refused permission if the polluter could demonstrate that there was,
as yet, no means of purifying the effluent. The perception following
the 1876 Act was that polluters could escape liability if they used the
latest technology. 
16
14. The rights of riparian owners are very strong, and since any
offender who ignores an injunction is guilty of contempt of court and
can be imprisoned, this means that the private riparian owner is in
the strongest possible position to defend his river against pollution.
But the cost is the great obstacle to actions.
15. See generally, A-G v. Basingstoke, 45 L.J. Ch. 726 (1876); A-
G v. Lonsdale 33 J.P. 534 (1868).
16. The effect of this was that: "it paid industry handsomely not to
discover new methods of effluent treatment. One court, for instance,
decided that it was not reasonable to expect any firm to spend more
than £100 on purifying its effluent... The view became established
that it was not their business to do anything unless the pollution was





A Royal Commission was established towards the end of the nine-
teenth century to enquire into the standards of purity of sewage and
industrial effluents which ought to be required under the Rivers Pol-
lution Prevention Acts. It recommended in its report of 1912 that a
certain standard of purity should be maintained to avoid a public
nuisance. Any standard should also allow for the availability of dilu-
tion for that effluent. However, the quality of water required to sup-
port fish life was not mentioned in the recommendation: sensitive
fish like salmon and trout would probably not have survived in water
that was polluted but still did not constitute a public nuisance.
The standard, which became known as the 30/20 standard, called
for an effluent with not more than 30 parts per million of suspended
solids and not more than 20 parts per million biological oxygen de-
mand (BOD) to be discharged into a receiving water giving at least
an eight-to-one dilution factor. The Royal Commission's recommen-
dations (although never given statutory effect) were interpreted by
local authorities as relieving them from all responsibility of taking
action, unless the recommended standards were breached. Both in-
dustrial and Council polluters therefore considered their effluent to
be acceptable as long as it did not infringe these standards. 17
Fishery Legislation
Government concern was aroused back in 1860 about the dwin-
dling salmon populations, with the result that a Commission was
appointed to look into salmon fisheries. The Salmon Act of 1861 set
down the seasons and methods of taking salmon and created the of-
fence of taking immature and spawning salmon. Coarse fishing was
similarly recognised by the Freshwater Fisheries Act of 1878.
By 1923 the legislation had been amended and patched up by 18
further acts of Parliament, including the creation of Fishery Boards
under the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act of 1907, but still
there was no effective protection against pollution. The powers of
the Rivers Pollution Prevention Acts (1876-1893) which had previ-
ously applied only to sanitary authorities, were extended by the 1907
Act to the new Fishery Boards. This was an improvement in that it
removed the conflict of interests arising from a local authority prose-
17. See GERRISH, supra note 5, at 9.
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cuting itself or a local counterpart - the gamekeeper and poacher
problem. Fishery Boards were also given the power by bylaws to
regulate the deposit of any matter detrimental to salmon, trout or
freshwater fish.
The Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act of 1923 consolidated all
the previous pieces of legislation and provided some improvements.
The defence of best practical means remained but the £100 limit was
dropped. The prosecution still had to prove that fish were present
when the waters became injurious to fish through the presence of a
specific polluting matter directly caused by the accused. The effect
of this was to make multiple prosecutions almost impossible - a fac-
tory owner could plead that any fish that might have been in a river
had already been killed by somebody's else's effluent before he dis-
charged his factory's waste. The Act also gave protection to spawn-
ing grounds, spawn and fish food sources. However, the benefits of
these changes must have been limited by the continuing need to ob-
tain Ministerial consent to an action against mining or manufacturing
pollution.
Still, the powers available to Fisheries Boards could have been
used to great effect. That they were not was largely due to lack of
money - some had budgets of as little as £200 a year ($12,000 18).
Successful prosecutions brought only small fines and their only
source of income was what they could raise by imposing licence du-
ties. Since few anglers would want to buy a licence to fish polluted
waters, it follows that the Fishery Boards responsible for the dirtiest
rivers also had the least money.
A Glimmer of Hope
The Public Health Act of 1936 seemed to offer an effective remedy
to polluted rivers and a relief to anglers. This Act rejected the efflu-
ent standard recommendations of the Royal Commission and in ef-
fect required sewage effluent to comply with the common law rights
of riparian owners.
However, any hope raised was short-lived as the Act was modified
by the Public Health (Drainage of Trade Premises) Act (1937). This
allowed industries to discharge their effluents into sewers (subject to
certain safeguards) and threw the onus of purifying them on to the




local authorities. In effect, polluters were able to pump effluents into
rivers, as the sewerage system simply could not cope with the vol-
umes and concentration of the discharges.' 
9
THE CRUSADING ANGLER
John Eastwood describing how he set up the ACA he says that he made
two sudden discoveries:
While pollution may have been inevitable in Queen Vic-
toria's time, this was no longer the case. During this cen-
tury science has made such strides that far the greater part
of existing pollution can be stopped.
This discovery completely alters our sense of values. If a
vital industry can get rid of its effluent only by poisoning
a river, there seems to be no answer; but, if the effluent
can be made harmless, is the industry entitled to destroy
the pleasure of millions merely for the sake of cheaper
production? An entirely new orientation of rights and du-
ties has thus arisen. There is the relative duty of an indus-
try to its shareholders, or a local authority to its ratepay-
ers, and the wider duty of both to the general public.
My second discovery was this. To all intents and pur-
poses every Act of Parliament dealing with pollution is a
penal Act - that is to say, it creates pollution offences
which are punishable in a criminal court. There is no Act
dealing with the civil rights of an injured person. This has
never been necessary because Civil rights are part of the
Common Law of the land. They are the basis of freedom,
and prescribe that an individual shall enjoy what is his
without undue interference.
2 0
19. "Strangely enough the lamentable amount of pollution exist-
ing today is due largely to the various acts of Parliament that have
been passed ostensibly to stop pollution." See GERRISH, supra note
5, at6.
20. John Eastwood, K.C., The Fight Against River Pollution,
ACA REVIEW 1998 at 13.
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He knew that the common law could work, but he was concerned
that riparian rights were not being enforced due to a lack of finance.
"The snag was that the costs of actions to enforce that right would be
enormous, because the chief defendants would be great city corpora-
tions, nationalised industries and huge combines who'd be bound to
fight them every inch of the way.",21 Eastwood wanted to know how
to overcome the difficulties of enforcing these rights.
According to his son Hugo, John Eastwood decided on providing a
practical solution when his family's fishing on the river Usk was
threatened by a proposed industrial barrage on the river. 22 The water
environment he loved might be irrevocably changed and he "wanted
to do something." He came up with the novel idea of an association
designed to spread the risk of an action in common law by raising
annual subscriptions among all those with property interest in water
to guarantee against legal costs. His correspondence from 1946
showed the first germ of the idea. "Did I tell you that I have been
working on a new scheme to protect our rivers against pollution? It
is rather original and aims at enrolling 500,000 anglers on co-
operative lines.., it is my own idea.,
23
In the two and a half years prior to the ACA's formation, he wrote
3,000 letters (in long-hand) to obtain support for the scheme. He also
wrote numerous articles, attended many meetings, gave interviews
and journeyed all over the country. He hoped to convince other fish-
ermen of his strategy, and to encourage them to follow him.24 His
sincerity and their self-interest would determine the success.
On February 6, 1948 the first meeting of the temporary committee
of the Anglers' Co-operative Association was held in a little room in
Lincoln's Inn Fields in London's legal district. The ACA was incor-
porated soon afterwards as ACA Trustee Company Limited. Upon a
Guarantee Fund made up of a £600 ($20,000) float given by the
Tackle Makers' Association and the fees of a modest membership,
the ACA was ready to start operations.
It is interesting to note that John Eastwood used the term co-
operative to describe his idea. Co-operative (self-help) movements
21. Pollution Talk on BBC, 4 ACA REVIEW No. 1 at 65 (1953).
22. Personal communication July 6, 2000 (on file with on author).
23. Dorothea Eastwood, The Birth of the A. C.A., ACA REVIEW





were far more prevalent prior to the formation of the welfare state.
At that time it was not unusual that finance for medical care and un-
employment insurance was provided through co-operative associa-
tions. It is unlikely that any environmental interest group would use
that title today, even though the basis of many environmental ideals
is co-operation. In 1994, on merging with the Pure Rivers Society,
the co-operative name was dropped in favour of conservation - The
Anglers' Conservation Association. What was fundamental to the
design of the organisation in 1946 had lost its social relevance.
Eastwood's appeal was not to a notion of public service (that is, as
a duty to help keep rivers clean, as most environmental groups do
today), but to all anglers' self-interest.
He also made it clear in his letters that the ACA would only sup-
port common law actions of those riparian owners and angling asso-
ciations who were paid-up members of the ACA. In order for on free
ride, one had to be sure that an ACA member or rich riparian owner
(who might litigate) was on the same stretch of river. Eastwood was
aware that the incentive to join the ACA would be stronger if he ex-
cluded non-members from its benefits. However, he was keen to
include other angling associations as he realised the importance of
their being members of the ACA. Moreover, the more people that
provided the public good of clean river water, the lower the cost to
those providing.
2. The ACA In Action
Anybody hoping to exercise riparian rights must have a legally-
recognised interest in the property. For angling clubs this means a
lease with the riparian landlord, preferably signed under seal, and
preferably including a clause in which the riparian owner agrees to
be a party in any legal action. Proper leases provide legal standing,
but it is important to make them for as long as possible - 7, 14, or
even 21 years are suggested by the ACA - for several reasons. On a
practical level, a longer lease gives greater incentive for anglers to
protect and improve their fisheries. And an action is less likely to be
brought by a club which only has a year-to-year lease because the
only damages that could be recovered if successful would be the loss
of a maximum of one year's amenity. A polluted river often takes
some years to recover before restocking can be attempted, and a club
with a short lease is likely to give up and go elsewhere. Most impor-
tant is the term of an injunction, restraining a polluter for ever. It is
appropriate when there is reason to believe that the pollution will
20031
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continue and it is strongly enforceable. But "for ever" actually refers
to the term of proprietary interest of the plaintiff. That is why it is
best to have the riparian owner as party to an action and why long
leases are a better insurance.
The property interest of the riparian owner or angling club is vital
to the protection of waterways. Without these bundles of rights, it is
doubtful whether the ACA would have ever been formed, or would
have been able to act if it had.
River Cynon, Wales
The power of these narrowly-defined rights were well illustrated
by an early ACA case. Following advice given in the ACA's Pollu-
tion Handbook, Dr. J. R. Steen restored the River Cynon, a 'dead
river' in the heart of the Welsh coal mining valleys to its former pu-
rity. Dr. Steen formed the Aberdare and District Anglers' Associa-
tion and obtained over 30 seven-year leases which covered the whole
river. With some preliminary advice from the ACA, the anglers of
Aberdare set about stopping the discharge of gas liquor by the Gas
Board, the pollution with coal slurry by the Coal Board and caused a
filter to be built to remove coal dust from the river. The Aberdare
Urban District Council gave assurances that sewage pollution would
cease, and other smaller sources of pollution were also cleaned up.
In 1950, the Co-operative Wholesale Society had proposed to dis-
charge chlorinated water into the river, but back-pedalled after hear-
ing from the ACA solicitors.
River Cray, Kent
The first case to be entirely handled and financed by the ACA oc-
curred in 1948.25 In March 1948, all the fish in the Club's lake at St
Mary Cray in Kent were killed. The ACA experts identified the
cause as sulphuric acid which was discharged from the defendants'
mills into the River Cray, which filled the Club's lake. The anglers
were successful and eventually received £1,250 ($40,000) in dam-
ages, which was handed over to the Club Secretary with great cere-
mony by John Eastwood himself.
25. Orpington and District Angling Association v. Vegetable
Parchment Mills Ltd, Progress Against Pollution, 1 ACA REVIEW
No. 1 at 10 (1950).
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It is interesting that, having stressed above the importance of a
proper fishing lease, the Orpington club had no fishing lease at all.
They rented the land on a verbal tenancy and fished from the land.
Neither did they have the right to fill their lake from the River Cray.
The ACA must have been very relieved to win the case for the
member and recover all their own costs. Gerrish mentioned several
years later that "few of our present members realise how near the
ACA was to crashing before it ever became airborne.., the only way
to save [the ACA] was to produce some tangible results, so the first
action sponsored by the ACA was started and, by the mercy of
providence, won with the backing of a fighting fund of just £200
($6,500)".26
However, the ACA was happy to report in May 1950 that it had
"won eight contested High Court actions in six months and in as
many more cases the required result was obtained without even hav-
ing to start legal proceedings. 27 Moreover, the many polluters who
had "snapped their fingers at Fishery Boards and Public Health Au-
thorities for years, have thrown in their hands as soon as a riparian
owner's action has been started against him.",
28
River Gade, Middlesex
One defendant in an early case did fight, and they were a £12 mil-
lion ($380 million) a year paper milling concern. The case was an
important one because large stretches of waterways were concerned.
The pollution alleged by the plaintiffs29 had already been the subject
of a report by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1932, and
26. C. Stratton Gerrish, From Our Legal Consultant, ACA
REVIEW No. 10 at 15 (1968).
27. Progress Against Pollution, I ACA REVIEW No. 3 at 59
(1950).
28. Id.
29. Elms Angling Club, Ltd. v. J. Dickinson & Co Ltd., Progress
Against Pollution, 1 ACA REVIEW No. 2 at 30 (1950); see also Fur-
ther Progress in Cases Already Reported, 1 ACA REVIEW No. 3 at
65 (1950) and Progress Against Pollution, 2 ACA REVIEW No. 4 at
53(1951).
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many subsequent complaints had been made. Penal proceedings had
been taken in 1939 but the Watford Bench had refused to convict.
The defendants denied any pollution of the River Gade, so a trial
was inevitable. The ACA Trustees Co Ltd gave the plaintiffs an
unlimited indemnity in respect of costs, although this must have
caused some anxiety since the case was expected to last for two or
three weeks and the costs to run high.
In the event, the defendants folded during the opening speech of
the ACA Counsel, and submitted to an injunction and costs. The
plaintiffs had been joined by many other angling clubs affected by
the pollution. Altogether, 40 miles of waterways stood to benefit
from the removal of the pollution.
During the course of the hearing Mr Justice Vaisey commented on
the most unsatisfactory state of affairs in which Parliament had set
up Boards with responsibility for preventing river pollution but had
failed to give them adequate powers with the result that 'public spir-
ited individuals have to undertake the enormous financial risks of
civil proceedings to deal with such cases as this.'
A RARE DEFEAT
The ACA suffered its first defeat in Stokoe v. Shand Ltd, a pollu-
tion case on 28th March 1966. Cyanide releases from the defen-
dant's premises in 1962/3 resulted in a series of fish kills on the
River Axe. Initially, the case was settled by negotiation, with the
defendant compensating the ACA members and assuring them that
he had taken additional precautions to prevent further escape of cya-
nide. However, within a few weeks there was another heavy killing
of fish caused by a cyanide release from the defendant's premises,
which convinced the ACA committee that it was useless to rely on
promises to reform. As the defendant had also been prosecuted by
the Devon River Board, a writ was issued claiming an injunction.
The defendant admitted responsibility but said he had made altera-
tions which would make it impossible for more cyanide to escape.
The judge decided against an injunction but kept the case open and
gave the plaintiff leave to apply to the Court for an immediate in-
junction if there was another incident.
In August 1965, another fish kill caused by cyanide occurred
downstream from the defendant's factory. The ACA pursued the
action despite knowing that it would be difficult to prove that the
cyanide originated from the defendant's factory. It was hoped that
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even if it were not possible to prove how the cyanide had been dis-
charged into the river, it would be possible to apply the rule in Ry-
lands v. Fletcher. Under this rule, the ACA might satisfy the court
that large quantities of cyanide were being stored by the defendants
without satisfactory safeguards and that they must be held responsi-
ble if any of it went astray. 30
The defendants denied that the cyanide had come from their fac-
tory and suggested that the poisoning of the river must have been the
work of poachers or saboteurs.
At the trial, the Judge rejected this alternative theory and was -
according to the ACA - satisfied that the cyanide could only have
come from the defendant's premises but there was absolutely no evi-
dence to show how it had got into the river. A court order against
'causing or permitting' harm was not broken merely by the defen-
dants pursuing a course of action which was certain to lead to a
breach of the Order or covenant. To enable the Court to interfere
there must be some direct action by the defendant in breach of the
Order.
As the ACA was only making an application under the Order ob-
tained previously, the costs involved to the Association were not
anything like as much as would have been incurred in a full scale
action but at the same time they were not trifling. "The one redeem-
ing feature is that in the course of the hearing the defendant's Coun-
sel announced that in January the defendant had decided to discon-
tinue the use of cyanide altogether for hardening steel and to adopt a




The ACA is meticulous in gathering evidence so that it can be very
certain of its case before considering taking action. The many ex-
perts used by ACA in investigations include chemical analysts, bi-
ologists, engineers, photographers (terrestrial and aerial), advisers on
rehabilitation and restocking of water. One of the great strengths of
the ACA method is that anglers are their own watchdogs. Over the
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years the ACA has trained volunteer anglers to become Water Pollu-
tion Officers for their clubs. The ACA Pollution Handbook gives
detailed instructions on how to take samples of what might be pol-
luted waters and get them sent off safely and quickly for analysis.
This is especially useful in the case of sudden pollution, or accidents.
Anglers are advised to note exactly where the incident occurred, at
what time and if necessary to chase the wave of pollution down-
stream and take a sample in their gum boots or thermos flask if they
haven't got anything else to hand.
Pollutants Not Necessarily Toxic
Many pollutions are caused by substances that are not toxic but
have simply overwhelmed the receiving environment. In a bizarre
incident in 1977, when a tanker turned over on a bridge, its contents
- one thousand gallons of orange juice32 - managed to ruin two
miles of excellent trout fishing.
In 1997 there was a fish kill caused by sugar syrup escaping from a
cider factory; 33 in 1999 fishing was repeatedly spoiled by soil enter-
ing the river from a carrot washing factory.34 Road works or in-river
works, gravel washing operations, and other activities which send
down suspended solids are a perennial problem. Although seemingly
innocuous, they cause discoloration, poor visibility and settle out on
the river bed, spoiling spawning grounds.
ACA TRUSTEES Co LTD AND THE GUARANTEE FUND
The guarantee fund acts like an insurance policy against loss in-
curred by plaintiffs through unsuccessful litigations. As with all in-
surance, the risk is spread as wide as possible so that individual par-
ticipators do not have to bear a disproportionate liability. The fund is
voluntary with a few large donors, but any sum is welcomed. But,
not all the costs incurred in presenting cases are recovered, so the
Trustees have to consider carefully which cases to support.
The ACA Trustee Company Limited has two outstanding objec-
tives. The first is to use the guarantee fund to spread the liability of
individual members taking actions against polluters. The second is to
32. See Editorial Notes, ACA REVIEW Summer 1977 at 5.
33. See Legal Review, ACA REVIEW Summer 1997 at 19.
34. See Legal Review, ACA REVIEW 1999 - 2000 at 34.
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step in and act as trustee for any club where club members are nerv-
ous of accepting the risk of becoming trustees themselves. Cases
revolving around the latter were frequent in the 1950s.
35
3. Landmark Cases
The ACA's most famous case is usually referred to simply as the
Pride of Derby.36 It established the ACA's reputation and later
alerted the author to the existence of the ACA. It involved a major
multiple pollution of the River Derwent, eight miles of which was
dead, as was three miles of the River Trent into which it flowed. The
water flowing past the plaintiff's property was "black, opaque, hot
and stinking; the bottom was carpeted with sewage fungus and the
temperature of the water was extremely high - often between 900
and 95'F. In summer it was completely deoxygenated. ' 37 In 1942,
salmon were still running up the river below Derby, but when the
ACA team investigated ten years later, the only life in the river was
mosquito larvae. When the Fishery Board turned a consignment of
roach into the river in November 1950 the fish died within a few
minutes.
The plaintiff's case was that the dry weather flow of the Derwent
below Derby was about 100 million gallons per day of which British
Celanese Ltd were extracting 72 million gallons. The Derby Corpo-
ration and British Celanese were discharging effluent amounting to
80 million gallons a day, all being bad effluents into the bargain. The
Derby Sewage works were overloaded. Having been built in 1906
and enlarged (following an adverse government report) in 1933 to
treat 6 millions gallons a day, in 1950 it was treating, or failing to
treat 9.5 million gallons a day. According to its own analysis, the
works rarely achieved more than 50 per cent purification, while of-
ten it was under 20 per cent. The British Electricity Authority's role
35. See e.g., ACA Trustees Co. Ltd and Others v. Thomas Bolton
and Sons, Ltd., Progress Against Pollution, 3 ACA REVIEW No. 1 at
7.
36. Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd. and
Earl of Harrington v. British Celanese Ltd, the Derby Corporation,
the British Electricity Authority [1952] 1 All E.R. 179 (1952);
[1953] 1 All E.R. 1326 (C.A. 1953).
37. Progress Against Pollution, 3 ACA REVIEW No. 2 at 27
(1952).
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in the affair was to take the results and heat them. This "Hell's
Brew," as the Plaintiffs' Counsel called it, made the river hotter than
the Red Sea. Even tropical fish could not have survived in it.
Before the trial opened, British Celanese Ltd withdrew its defence
and only asked that the inevitable injunction be suspended.
After listening to the evidence for nearly two days the remaining
defendants admitted that the plaintiff's water was substantially pol-
luted, but the Corporation denied that their sewage had anything to
do with it and British Electricity Authority (BEA) contended that the
high temperature was beneficial to fish and assisted them in spawn-
ing.
Apart from these defences, both the BEA and the Derby Corpora-
tion claimed that their special statutory powers could override the
common law; in effect claiming that they were entitled to pollute the
river. BEA admitted that its power station had been enlarged until it
was too big for the river. The surveyor to the Derby Corporation
stated that he had first reported the overloaded and unsatisfactory
state of the sewage works in 1946, but that no plan had been drawn
up until three months after the commencement of the ACA action.
Defending Counsel argued that, provided the sewage works was
properly constructed originally, the local authority could not be
compelled to enlarge or improve it because the population had in-
creased, nor to keep it running efficiently and so could not be an-
swerable to a riparian owner if its works were overloaded.
Mr Justice Harman found against all the defendants and issued in-
junctions against them all. He found that neither the Corporation nor
BEA had proven prescription by their private statutes. During his
judgement he said that a distressing feature of the case was the inac-
tivity of the UK Government's Fishery Board which, in spite of the
obvious facts which had been apparent for many years, had done
nothing.38
The Derby Corporation and British Electricity appealed the ruling,
which was heard by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Evershed, Lord
Justice Denning and Lord Justice Romer in the Court of Appeal in
December 1953. 39 In his judgement, the Master of the Rolls said that
Derby Corporation's appeal rested on two points. The first was that,
if they acted within the Derby Corporation Acts of 1907 and 1930,
the plaintiff had no cause of action. The second was that, even if the
38. Id. at 39.
39. [1953] 1 All ER 1326 (C.A. 1953).
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plaintiff did have a cause of action, no injunction ought ever to be
granted against the Derby Corporation or any local authority in re-
spect of sewage pollution, and that to do so was an improper inter-
ference with the Minister of Housing and Local Government and an
impudent invasion of the sovereign authority of the Derby Corpora-
tion. The Master of the Rolls said he was shocked at the suggestion
that it was improper for the plaintiffs to ask for protection in Her
Majesty's Courts. Defendant's Counsel withdrew the suggestion and
agreed that it should not have been made. His Lordship also refused
to consider the suggestion that since it would cost a lot of money to
stop the pollution and the plaintiffs fishing had a low value, the
court ought to exercise its discretion and refuse an injunction.
His Lordship came to the conclusion, which became a highly in-
fluential precedent, that the Derby Corporation Acts expressly pro-
hibited the defendants from causing a nuisance. Only a private stat-
ute which specifically authorised pollution could override the com-
mon law. He found the wholly admirable judgement of Mr Justice
Harman was correct in every particular: the appeal failed and was
dismissed, with costs.
BEA appealed for a variation in terms of the injunction. Since it
had a statutory right to return hot water to the river so long as it did
not damage the fish, it asked whether it might not reduce the tem-
perature to suit the fish, rather than to cool it completely. His Lord-
ship agreed to limit the injunction, but gave the Earl of Harrington
leave to apply for restoration of the full injunction if in the future he
should want to use the river for other purposes.
Reviewing the case 15 years later, C Stratton Gerrish, revealed that
"if British Celanese Limited, the first defendants in the Derby case,
had not thrown their hands in when they did the ACA would have
had to drop the case as the guarantee fund was then insufficient to
cover the costs of a prolonged trial against three defendants."
40
The success of the Pride of Derby case has had lasting effects. In
1980, the Secretary of Derbyshire County Council Angling Club had
to turn away 600 applications for season tickets and refuse hundreds
of applications for angling matches on this very stretch of river. "The
match-angling ace, Ivan Marks, said that the Lower Derwent is the
best angling venue in England.'
40. C. Stratton Gerrish, From Our Legal Consultant, 16 ACA
REVIEW No. 10 at 15 (1968).
41. Id.
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Now the area along the south bank of the Lower Derwent is a park
and nature trail, created and maintained by the Derby City Council
and supported by Acordis (formerly British Celanese). Acordis still
extracts 204 million litres (45 million gallons) a day for cooling from
its settling lakes. After use, a small amount goes to Severn Trent
Water's treatment plant and the rest is returned directly to the river.
There are many factories and works on the north side of the river,
including Rolls Royce plc. The power plant further down the river is
recognisable by its cluster of cooling towers. The river is now
healthy and supports chub, dace, gudgeon, perch, pike, roach and
barbel. The park and river trail are a considerable civic amenity, and
the private nature reserve owned and run by Acordis and even Sev-
ern Trent's sludge lagoons provide a livelihood for a variety of wild-
life. Nowadays, anglers are outnumbered by cyclists and dog walk-
ers, but if the ACA had not succeeded in stopping pollution when it
did, the river and its environs might have deteriorated further, with
these new amenities not yet provided.
Case Mix and Advisory Role
During the Pride of Derby case, the ACA received a lot of notice
in the press. Up to 1953, 192 cases of pollution or anticipated pollu-
tion had been referred to the ACA.4 2 Most often, members wanted
only advice and the ACA was asked to take action in only 35. Of
these 8 could not be pursued because the member had no legal title
and his landlord would not co-operate - in most cases the landlord
was the Docks and Inland Waterways Executive. In four cases "we
came to the conclusion after investigation that the member's claim
was bogus or completely trivial. 43 Fifteen cases were dealt with
without legal action; 8 were continuing pollutions which were
stopped and 7 were non-recurring pollution in which compensation
was paid to the injured party. Writs were issued in 22 cases against
25 defendants. Out of these cases, "13 threw their hands in almost as
soon as a writ was issued; 6 submitted to judgement in later stages
before trial and only 6 actually let the matter come into Court."
44







Pollution of the sea coast and estuaries in 1950 was 'appalling' de-
spite the vigorous tidal action around the coasts.45 However, it was
established in Magna Carta that all tidal rivers are for the benefit of
all members of the public, and only inland rivers and streams are
subject to private ownership rights. This left the ACA with no direct
course of action to help struggling sea anglers, except that reducing
pollution in a river also reduces pollution reaching an estuary. How-
ever, the ACA's lawyer knew of a possible cause of action in that
polluted salt water prevents the exit and return of migratory fish - an
infringement of the common law rights of the fishery owner.
An important new decision had been made in the case of Nicholl
and Others v. Penybont Main Sewerage Board (1951)46 in which the
plaintiffs had obtained an injunction against the discharge of un-
treated sewage into the Ogmore below Bridgend in south Wales. The
significance of this was that the anglers were lessees of the fishing
rights on the river for eight miles above the source of pollution: the
pollution was preventing the free passage of sea trout and other mi-
gratory fish up the river. Despite this decision, there were other
grounds of action against the defendants (discharge of raw sewage
being illegal under the Public Health Act) so the issue of the free
passage of fish was not fully argued. Moreover, the site of the pollu-
tion was in the freshwater part of the river. However, another case
soon clarified the issue.47
The lead plaintiff, Colonel Myddelton, claimed that salmon smolts
were being killed in the River Dee estuary in Wales, and his fishery,
35 to 40 miles upstream, was being harmed. The only cause of action
was the obstruction of the free movement of fish between their
spawning ground and the sea. The ACA knew this would be an im-
portant case and asked for increased guarantees from their members
in case the action took a long time to present. Counter-guarantees
were put up by the netsmen of the Dee estuary who were losing their
livelihood because of estuarial pollution.
45. BRITISH FIELD SPORTS ASSOCIATION, POLLUTION REPORT,
1950 (on file with author).
46. Further Progress in Cases Already Reported, 3 ACA REVIEW
No. 4 at 53 (1952).
47. Myddelton and Others v. John Summers and Sons, Ltd., see
Progress Against Pollution, 5 ACA REVIEW No. I at 4 (1954).
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Colonel Myddelton had previously, and largely at his own expense
managed to restrain Monsanto Chemicals Ltd from polluting further
up the river. 48 The case had been strongly contested and it was on
this case that John Eastwood was working when he died in 1952. But
cleaning the tidal estuary was the key to restoring the river.
At that time, local authorities and industrialists had come to as-
sume that pollution of tidal waters was permissible. In fact, polluters
could have been prosecuted under the Salmon and Freshwater Fish-
eries Act of 1923, but there was great difficulty in proving an of-
fence under this Act in the case of multiple pollution.49 The pollut-
ants in the estuary were being washed back and forth by the tide and
determining which was discharged by whom and which caused the
mischief was impossible. The common law has no such difficulty
with multiple pollution, as liability of a number of polluters is joint
and several - the injured party can sue any one or more of them for
full reparation of damage. It is not necessary to apportion or evaluate
the blame or liability as between them. The polluter cannot escape
liability by proving that someone else was also polluting the river.
This case was important to all anglers because many estuaries had
suffered from this lack of control: migratory fish were almost extinct
in the Tyne and Tees and being obstructed by pollution in the estuar-
ies of the Usk, Severn, Wyre, Taw and Torridge.
Mr Justice Roxburgh found that cyanide pollution by the defen-
dant, J. Summers and Sons Limited, created a material obstruction to
the free passage of salmon through the estuary. This pollution was an
interference with the right of the fishery owners on the river and thus
there should be judgement for the plaintiff in the form of an injunc-
tion and damages. In the event, it took only two months to solve the
problem. A new closed-circuit cooling system was installed which
prevented the escape of cyanide into the Dee estuary. Although this
cost the company £6,000 ($138,000) and would have been cheaper if
built in from the start, it was probably not too great an inconvenience
for a large plant to sustain.
That most trouble in estuaries could have been prevented quite eas-
ily with proper control and forethought was noted by the ACA, but
at the same time it saw no cause for rushing headlong into an irre-
48. Myddelton and Others v. Monsanto Chemicals, Ltd., see Pro-
gress Against Pollution, 3 ACA REVIEW No. 3 at 40 (1952) and
Progress Against Pollution, 4 ACA REVIEW No. I at 25 (1953).
49. See CARTY & PAYNE, supra note 6, at 75.
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sponsible witch hunt among polluters of estuaries. Even so, they did
expect to see the polluters start "setting their houses in order." But
while industry had shown itself anxious to play its part in Britain's
clean-the-rivers campaign, it soon became clear that local authority
sewage works posed a far more intractable problem.
For example, the Tyne estuary was of particular importance, both
economically, being the port of Newcastle, but also because the
Tyne local auhtorities failed to stop other pollution and influenced
local authorities responsible for pollution not to bring prosecutions.
In 1927, 3361 salmon were registered caught in the Tyne; by 1955
only three were caught. 50 In 1959, the Tyne "continued to fester on
the densely populated borders of Northumberland and Durham." 5' It
was "devastatingly foul" with 30 to 40 million gallons poured in




John Eastwood well understood that financial maintenance of ac-
tions by third parties with no direct interest in a case is generally
unlawful.53 For this reason, only ACA members could be assisted
and only cases that were of interest to other anglers were taken up. It
was always made known to defendants when the ACA gave indem-
nities to plaintiffs. In Martell and Others v. Consett Iron Co Ltd
54
the fundamental question was raised whether this common cause
was a sufficient common interest in the eyes of the law to justify
anglers generally in financing legal action by one particular angler or
riparian owner to protect one particular piece of water.
This case struck at the heart of the ACA's activities. Consett Iron
Company Limited claimed the financial and technical assistance
given by the ACA to its members amounted to illegal maintenance
50. Don Everitt, Let's Clean Up Our Poisoned Rivers, 10 ACA
REVIEW No. 10 at 31 (1959).
51. Editorial, 10 ACA REVIEW No. 10 at 38 (1959).
52. Don Everitt, Let's Clean Up Our Poisoned Rivers, 10 ACA
REVIEW No. 10 at 31 (1959).
53. See generally CARTY & PAYNE, supra note 6.
54. [1954] 3 All E.R. 339 (1954); [1955] 1 All E.R. 481 (1955
C.A.).
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and was a criminal offence. That is, that the ACA had no proprietary
interests in the action and therefore should not be allowed to fund the
action. Obviously if this claim had been upheld, it would have put an
end to most of the ACA's legal activity.
Mr Justice Danckwerts considered the legal challenge in a hearing
before the case proper could be heard. Consett's claim was rejected,
the Judge holding that anglers and others were justified and entitled
to band together to protect rivers from pollution.
55
On Appeal, Lord Justice Jenkins upheld the ruling and held that
the range of relevant interests which was sufficient to justify the as-
sistance given by the ACA was much wider than those claimed by56
the defendant. He said that maintenance could be extended to visi-
tors and those who came to fish merely by permission of the owner,
and that fishing tackle dealers and proprietors of local hotels which
relied on the anglers for business could maintain the action. 57 Indeed,
on the principle of mutual protection, those with interests in any
58river which might suffer the same fate, could qualify. Within a
year the ACA ensured that its fighting fund was only contributed to
by those who fell under Lord Jenkins' specification of "common
cause."
The legality of the ACA and its procedure have been
challenged in the courts and upheld by the High Court
and the Court of Appeal. Although we have always been
prepared for such a challenge it would be idle to pretend
that it did not cause some very anxious moments when it
came, but by and large it was worth it as it procured for
us invaluable guidance as to how and to what extent we
may legally help our members.
59
55. [1954] 3 All E.R. 339.
56. [1955] 1 All E.R. at 488.
57. Id. at 499.
58. Id. at 501.
59. C. STRATTON GERRISH, Preface to the Fourth Edition,
POLLUTION: THE ACA HANDBOOK (5th ed. ACA Press 1973).
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Maintaining Good Relations with Polluters
In general, the relations between the ACA and defendants re-
mained cordial, 60 although the ACA Review, as early as 1957, had
pointed out a difference in attitudes between commercial and public
sector defendants:
We continue to find an increasing readiness on the part of
industrial concerns to take voluntary action to remedy
pollution. Local authorities, however, are still being diffi-
cult. No doubt some of them genuinely want to bring
their sewage works up to date and to fulfil their statutory
obligations under the Public Health Act and are only pre-
vented from doing so by the refusal of the Ministry of
Health to sanction the necessary work, but there are still a
good many local authorities who simply have no inten-
tion of spending money on avoiding pollution unless they
are absolutely compelled to do so. In dealing with these
local authorities we have to bear in mind that national
considerations must prevail and to try to achieve a result
which will remedy the injustice to the individual without
upsetting the national economy.
61
The ACA became expert in ways to stop and prevent pollution,
and although it has no obligation it has always been very willing to
give advice to polluters, both to save them from the expense of court
action and to minimise the costs of technical improvements. The
1950 ACA Review reported that the ACA had anticipated a risk of
pollution from a new housing estate in Berkshire and had drawn at-
tention to it. The Newbury Rural District Council was proposing to
build a surface-water sewer from the new estate into a small brook
which flows into the River Lambourn. Although the local authority
had statutory power to lay the sewer, the ACA thought it wise to
point out that the effluent must satisfy the rights of riparian owners
to an absolutely clean river, and not merely to satisfy public health
requirements.
60. Wilmot v. Portals, John Allen and Sons, Ltd., see Notes on
Pending Cases, 16 ACA REVIEW No. 2 at 15 (1965).
61. See BATE, supra note 4, at 70 (citing Editorial, 7 ACA
REVIEW No. 1 at 5 (1957)).
2003]
400 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
A similar negotiation took place in 1962.62 Life in the River Crim-
ple below the Harrogate Sewage Works outfall was extinguished due
to effluent from the sewage works, which at times reduced the whole
of the water in the stream to the quality of a substandard sewage ef-
fluent. Enquiries disclosed that Harrogate Corporation was aware of
the position and had already prepared plans to modernise the sewage
works. However, it also planned to increase capacity, which meant
that the volume of effluent would be double the natural flow of the
stream. This, the ACA were advised, was bound to cause pollution.
At that stage the Corporation could not, or would not, say what the
quality of the effluent would be. "In previous cases, local authorities
against whom injunctions have been granted after they have built
new sewage works have complained bitterly that it is much more
expensive to make alterations and improvements after the works
have been built than it would have been to do the job properly in the
first instance, so this action was started in the hope of avoiding a
similar situation."63 (ACA, 1962, 13, 4:18-19).
The plaintiffs (Mr G. Dent and Mr J.H. Dent) asked for damages
only for the existing pollution, and an injunction restraining the de-
fendants from constructing or enlarging the sewage works without
ensuring that they would cease to pollute the river.
Long after the writ was issued, the defendants stated that they in-
tended to supplement the conventional treatment of the sewage with
tertiary treatment by irrigation over grass roots. The plaintiffs were
advised that, because of the lack of dilution, the defendants' actions
would simply create another form of pollution from nitrate, phos-
phate and potash (which were the end products of 1960s sewage pu-
rification techniques) and, if present in excess, would cause uncon-
trollable growths of flannel weed, rushes and similar undesirable
weed. The ACA also departed from normal practice by pointing out
to the defendants that they could discharge the effluent from the new
works into the River Nidd where there was ample dilution for it, in-
stead of into the Crimple. However, the defendants were not pre-
pared to do this and maintained that the discharge of the effluent into
the Crimple would not cause as much damage as was claimed by the
plaintiffs.
62. See Dent and Dent v. Harrogate Corporation, Progress




The defendants agreed that the river had been clear previously, and
had supported a good mixed fishery with coarse fish and trout. They
agreed to pay full costs and re-stock, after their works were com-
plete. Still, the Corporation decided to carry on with its plans and
hope for the best. However, it was warned by the Judge that it must
not pollute by making sure that its releases had adequate dilution and
agreed that, should that occur, it would build a pipeline to discharge
elsewhere, probably in the River Nidd. This was allowed by Mr Jus-
tice Plowman on 4th March 1962.
Pollution ceased after this incident with no repeat cases. This is a
good example of how the ACA tried to negotiate a settlement to save
taxpayers' money by making sure that sewage works were adequate.
In other cases, there was no option but to spend considerable
amounts of its own time and money to prevent determined local au-
thorities from continuing to pollute.
DEFENCES
Pollution is simply another aspect of the ancient laws of trespass
and nuisance, which are part of the common law. It is an infringe-
ment of the owner's right to enjoy the use of his property without
interference. These rights also apply to abstraction, as was estab-
lished in Edinburgh Water Trustees v. Sommerville & Son,64 which
states "[w]hen an Act of Parliament authorises interference with the
natural flow, the original rights of the riparian proprietors are im-
paired only so far as the reasonable exercise of the statutory rights
impairs them." 6
5
There are two key defences to a common law action that affect
river pollution. These are prescription and conduct permitted by stat-
ute.
PRESCRIPTION
Pollution by custom, or plaintiffs granting pollution rights is un-
usual. A prescriptive right is deemed to exist when a nuisance caused
64. 95 L.T.R. 217. (1906). See also Medway Co. v. Earl of Rom-
ney, 4 L.T.R. 87 (1861).
65. See WISDOM, supra note 5 at 87.
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by the defendant has been continuing for a long period to the full
knowledge of the plaintiff without complaint from the plaintiff.
66
A defendant who can show a prescriptive right has a good defence
in an action for pollution. For example, he might show that he has
been causing pollution for a long time (usually 20 years) and, as no-
body has complained before, he has effectively attained the right.
For example, a case of tin miners using a natural stream for washing
ore was held to be "good custom" since it was a reasonable use and
67limited to the necessary working of the mine. However, as realised
in Goodman v. Saltash Corporation68 prescription can only be
claimed for something that has a lawful origin at common law. The
discharge of untreated sewage into tidal waters polluting oyster
beds69 was unacceptable and did not constitute an easement. Most
important, if the defendant has secretly enjoyed the alleged easement
to pollute and the plaintiff was unaware that pollution was occurring,
then a prescriptive right is not granted. 7
Prescription was the defence used in Golden Hill Fishing Club v.
Wansford Trout Farm in 1986 in the ACA's first action against a
trout farm.7 1 In 1982 the trout farm was polluting the West Beck, one
of the best chalk streams in Britain. It was also abstracting large
quantities of water which at times cut off all instream flows to the
Beck.
The fish farm claimed the right to abstract and pollute by easement
because it had been farming trout since 1955. The ACA challenged
the defence by claiming that the level of abstraction and pollution
had increased over time. As evidence they cited the sales revenue for
the Wansford Trout Farm which was £58,907 in 1973 but by 1981
had increased to £616,329 (roughly £200,000 in 1973 prices). Nego-
tiations broke down and action in the High Court followed. The
ACA's costs, had they lost, would have been in excess of £80,000
($200,000). Nevertheless, when the ACA's Pollution Sub-committee
met in London, it unanimously voted to go to the High Court.
66. Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852, 865 (1879).
67. Carlyon v. Lovering, 1 H. & N. 784 (1857).
68. 48 L.T.R. 39 (1882).
69. Foster v. Warblington U.D.C., 1 K.B. 648 (1906).
70. Liverpool Corporation v. Coghill, 1 Ch. 307 (1918).




In front of the Judge the trout farm backed down and agreed to
remedy the conditions and pay costs and damages to the Golden Hill
Fishing Club of £32,500 ($88,000).
Five years later the trout farm again polluted the West Beck, caus-
ing harm to rights of the Golden Hill Fishing Club. The pollution in
1990/91 was held to be contempt of court since the farm had an in-
junction against it following its pollution in 1986. Mr Justice Henry
fined it £500 ($1,280) for each breach of covenant (14 breaches in
total). The Managing Director of the trout farm did not have his
property sequestered nor was he sent to jail "because of the efforts
the company was now making to counter the pollution." 72 It put in
operation pumps, which increased its costs by £46,500 ($120,000),
and a biological filter, which cost £50,000 ($128,000).
This was a notable legal victory by the ACA in overcoming the de-
fence of prescription, but the other defence, statute, is by far the
more important. It is more difficult to overcome as it arises through
parliamentary legislation.
Statutory Authority - Private Acts
The case of Nicholl v. Penybont Main Sewerage Board73 has al-
ready been mentioned with regard to the plaintiff being upstream
from the polluter. But another aspect in the case was that the plaintiff
had also asked for a mandatory order compelling the defendants to
demolish and remove the valve and outfall, as it existed solely to
discharge unpurified sewage which, in any case, was illegal under
the Public Health Act. However, six years later in January 1958, the
Penybont Main Sewerage Board deposited a Private Bill with Par-
liament which would allow it to carry on discharging sewage as be-
fore. It was stated quite openly in the subsequent proceedings before
Parliament that the sole purpose of this bill was to have the injunc-
tion rescinded.
The Board had applied to the Ministry of Housing and Local Gov-
ernment, which then had the responsibility for cleaning up rivers, to
give its special authority to the Private Bill. The Ministry strongly
approved of the move, citing the expense of altering the sewage ar-
rangements and claiming that the relevant section of the Public
72. Polluting Trout Farm Faces Bill of 'At Least £250,000,' ACA
NEWS, Autumn 1991 at 1-2.
73. See supra note 46.
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Health Act could not be complied with by any inland sewage dis-
posal scheme at all.
Fortunately, the Parliamentary Agents retained by the ACA no-
ticed the Bill and action was taken to amend the Penybont Main
Sewerage Bill so that the common law rights of riparian owners on
the Ogmore and Ewenni rivers remained. Riparian owners on the
Colne River were not so lucky when they referred a case of pollution
from a new sewage works. The Hertfordshire County Council had
pre-empted the ACA by some years when it promoted a Private Act
to protect the Colne Valley Sewage Board from action against any
polluting activity in 1937. The Act provided that "no riparian owner
or other party injured by the discharge of effluent from the Works
shall have any right of actions against the Board either for an injunc-
tion or damages."
In this case, the only way forward was for the ACA to table its
own private bill to amend that of the Sewage Board. In the event, the
ACA action did prompt improvements to be made and the pollution
was brought under control. Had the plaintiffs been standing alone
they would not have known about the removal of their rights nor
been in a position to do anything about it. The Parliamentary action
in the Penybont case took £2,500 ($52,000) to carry through - a sum
well beyond most individuals.
Interpretation of what is unintentionally allowed by conduct per-
mitted by the State is varied, and hence may include pollution as a
by-product of a necessary and approved activity. It is, therefore, the
most frequent defence. Other statutory defences have failed, for ex-
ample as mentioned above in the case of the Derby Corporation, and
British Electricity Authority, because the authority to pollute was
assumed to come with the statutory duty to perform public services,
rather than expressly permitted.
4. How ACA Affected Government Policy and Legislation
74
When not bringing Common Law actions against polluters the
ACA's most important job was in lobbying government to prevent
pollution. For much of the time this lobbying was to prevent Gov-
ernment legislation that made pollution more likely.
74. See generally Bate supra note 4 (for a full discussion of the
role of the ACA in affecting Government Policy and Legislation).
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The Fishery Boards and the River Boards whose job it was to pre-
vent pollution generally failed in every regard. Part of the problem
was the background of decision-making committees whose members
had an interest in the water environment, but mainly from a com-
mercial angle. Most were from local business, such as farmers and
industrialists, or local government. Few, if any, were from fisheries,
although some may have been landowners. Therefore, many of the
members of the various boards were themselves potential polluters
and it is not surprising that the boards were unsuccessful in prevent-
ing pollution.
An example of why so many committees were unsuccsful at com-
bating pollution can be found in discussions of uniform emission
standards (UES). Many committees and even Acts of Parliaments
proposed UES. When originally suggested by a Royal Commission
of 1912, the standards would have taken notice of the impact that
effluent would have on the receiving environment. In other words, it
was not simply the amount or type of effluent that mattered, but also
the amount of water and flow of the river. However, in practice the
assimilative capacity of the receiving environment was ignored, and
the operation of UES omitted half the equation. It provided certainty
for the polluter, but would lead to pollution. Fortunately, UES were
never given statutory authority. They were interpreted as guidelines,
allowing common law actions to proceed.
The ACA maintained a running campaign against such statutory
protection (because of business lobbying aimed at ensuring that UES
should protect polluters). It spent considerable sums reminding gov-
ernment officials that UES, if defined as a statutory authorisation by
government, would stop any common law action against a polluter
complying with their UES, regardless of the pollution caused.
Acknowledging the power of the interests against it and in favour
of UES, the ACA suggested a compromise to the government. The
common law should remain as it was (hence UES was not a statutory
authorisation and would not undermine the common law) but, in any
case where national economic interests might have been affected by
any common law action, the Attorney General could apply to the
Court for an extension of time before the order of the Court (such as
an injunction) became operative. This amendment was supported by
members on both sides of the House and in the end the Minister
withdrew the two subsections which would have undermined com-
mon law. This was the first instance in which the ACA successfully
influenced public policy largely through thousands of ACA members
writing letters to their MPs. And it became a model for future action.
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Every two or three years there was a crisis, where a particular com-
mittee recommended the attenuation of Common Law through legis-
lation, and each time the ACA succeeded in preventing the worst
from occurring. The ACA became influential enough that British
Environment Secretary's would meet with them to discuss how to
protect rivers. One such Under Secretary said, "I am sure that most
people with concern for the environment will recognise that common
law actions have been one of the main defences - and sometimes the
only defence - against river pollution; and that even with our pro-
posed improvements in administration and control we could ill af-
ford to do without them. 75
Nevertheless there was a continual battle to stop legal pollutant
discharges from undermining the ACA's main mode of action. In
1989 the water industry was privatised in Britain and at the same
time a new body, the National Rivers Authority was formed. The
ACA thought that the National Rivers Authority (NRA), the new
government inspectorate, was a step in the right direction. However,
they were concerned that the NRA, like the river and fishery boards,
would be ineffectual. "At present there is nothing [the NRA] can do,
because in order to make a success of water privatisation the gov-
ernment gave legal permission to the water authorities to discharge
sewage into rivers pending the building of adequate sewage works,
so the NRA, like an army awaiting its supplies of ammunition, will
only be able to tackle the problem when the Government's deroga-
tions expire in a few years' time." 76
Nevertheless, the ACA co-operated in several actions with the
NRA. The NRA was to benefit from a change in public, and hence
political, sympathy from producer to environmental and consumer
interests. The resulting switch in emphasis was manifested in 'green'
legislation, which partly sprang from the strong showing of the
Green Party in the 1989 European elections. As a result the NRA
was given the power to deliver environmental protection, unlike its
predecessors. The NRA fast developed a good reputation for com-
bating pollution of English rivers, and continued to co-operate with
the ACA until it became part of the Environment Agency in 1995. 77
75. Dermot Wilson, M.C., Report for 1972, 19 ACA REVIEW No.
3 at 21 (1973).
76. Ken Sutton, A Blue/Green Future, ACA REVIEW Summer
1990 at 4.
77. See CARTY & PAYNE, supra note 6, at 101.
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The NRA was helped by the separation of the environmental pro-
tection function of the former water authorities from the provision of
water and sewerage services.
The NRA took action against several newly privatised water com-
panies, but private individuals (backed by the ACA) brought the
first-ever action against a water company in 1992.78
The clarity of riparian property rights and the greater experience of
the ACA in fighting river pollution sometimes meant that, in the co-
operation between the ACA and NRA, it was the ACA that played
the dominant role.
MINEWATER TEST CASE
In 1992, the ACA took on the very risky and seemingly insuper-
able problem of pollution caused by flooded, decommissioned coal
mines. ACA Trustees Ltd v. British Coal (1992) 79 was the case that
generated the most publicity for the ACA since Pride of Derby. It
prosecuted British Coal over pollution of the River Rhymney in
South Wales, alleging that contaminated water from a closed-down
colliery had caused pollution and killed fish. The nationalised coal
industry had been protected by statute and no common law actions
had been possible to this point. The summons issued under the Wa-
ter Resources Act 1991, which made the offence a criminal rather
than a civil matter, claimed "that the discharge was caused by the
cessation of pumping at Britannia colliery, which stopped mining
operations in 1990."8 The outcome of the case depended on whether
British Coal knowingly permitted pollution to reach the river. Until
that time, switching off the pumps at a disused pit had not consti-
tuted this. 8' A successful prosecution would impose an enormous
burden on British Coal - a declining industry - as it would have to
continue to pump out numerous pits recently abandoned as uneco-
nomical.
78. See Leek and District Fly Fishing Club (Staffordshire Branch)
v. Severn Trent Water, Ltd., see also 'Speedy' Is Relative, ACA
REVIEW Summer 1992 at 15.
79. See Minewater Fight Goes On, ACA REVIEW Summer 1994 at
3.
80. See Four Historic Cases, ACA REVIEW Summer 1993 at 4.
81. Id.
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The Judge at Cardiff Crown Court ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to show that British Coal had 'knowingly polluted' the
Rhymney and hence the ACA lost only its third case ever. However,
the judge said that the costs of £120,000 ($245,000) should be paid
from government funds because of the importance of the ACA's
action. The ACA appealed because one of its legal advisers con-
cluded: "that contrary to this ruling, the ferruginous discharge into




The significance of this case extended far beyond the River
Rhymney. Perhaps as much as 450 miles of rivers in England and
Wales are affected by discharges from abandoned mines. The most
dramatic example is over the future of the River Wear in Co Dur-
ham. The river and its tributaries are home to migratory salmon and
sea trout, but with the closure of the area's last big colliery (Easing-
ton) several years ago, there are growing fears that the eventual end-
ing of pumping could result in the rivers becoming almost totally
lifeless.
The National Rivers Authority signed a formal agreement with
British Coal whereby it will receive at least 14 days' notice of any
intention to suspend pumping. The ACA will receive the same con-
sideration. If necessary, the NRA (now the Environment Agency)
could then seek legal action to prevent pollution occurring, rather
than bringing a prosecution after the damage had been done.
April 1995 saw the formation of the Environment Agency, which
was to coordinate the system of integrated pollution control and pro-
vide an "environment one stop shop," regulating water, land and air
pollution under one roof.
The litigation over the River Rhymney was compromised in 1996
by an agreement to set up a task group charged with commissioning
a study and ultimately finding a solution to the problem. The River
Rhymney Task Group comprised the Environment Agency, the Coal
Authority, the Welsh Office, the Caerphilly County Borough Coun-
cil and angling clubs, and was chaired by the ACA. The Task Group
suggests methods of remedying the problem, and economic consult-
ants are preparing a cost-benefit study of the various options. These
are still under review at the time of writing.
82. See Minewater Fight Goes On, ACA REVIEW Summer 1994 at
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CURRENT AND PLANNED LEGISLATION
The ACA is currently concerned with Section 48(2) of the Water
Resources Act (1991), which gives a defence to a common law ac-
tion if the conditions of an abstraction licence had been properly ful-
filled. The ACA has lobbied against this section ever since, but to
June 2002 with no success.
The water abstraction regime is currently under review by the En-
vironment Agency. New proposals include the introduction of time-
limited licences, the restitution of common law rights to relief from
harm caused by over-abstraction, the abolition of licences of right
and the revocation of licences causing environmental harm. In addi-
tion a consultation process on fisheries legislation is continuing, with
reports due to be published in mid-2002. The recommendations are
likely to include new fishery plans, a new environmental court to
deal with pollution (it is hoped this will make the ACA's job easier)
and making siltation of rivers an environmental offence.
5. Conclusions
English common law is working at its best when the deterrent ef-
fect is complete. The preventative power of an ex-post liability sys-
tem relies on the threat of action. Where rights are clearly defined, as
with anglers and rivers, potential polluters know exactly what action
they can take. There is no doubt that the ACA's actions, based on
common law protection of private rights over water and fishing, are
a significant threat to would-be polluters. That few cases find their
way into Court merely shows the strength of the ACA's methods.
An estimate of how much pollution they prevented is impossible to
calculate. Their more famous cases show that they cleaned up (and
kept clean) hundreds of miles of rivers in industrial areas, such as the
Derwent, Trent and Dee (Estuary).
The extremely successful and efficient out-of-court settlement of
disputes means that the ACA is not well known to the general pub-
lic. It is obvious from the ACA reviews that it has always been a
struggle for the ACA staff to maintain membership. When the ACA
was bringing actions (and receiving newspaper coverage) its mem-
bership kept increasing, from 1,500 in 1950 to 10,000 in 1966. As
the powerful common law deterrent became widely known among
local authority and business circles, any disputes were quickly set-
tled in the anglers' favour. Even members who had directly bene-
fited from ACA actions forgot to renew their subscriptions because
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the threat of pollution had been removed so effectually. Membership
declined until the notable actions of the 1980s, when it rose to its
current 16,500 (of which 2,000 are club members, representing over
250,000 anglers in total).
The ACA rarely failed, but was particularly frustrated by polluters,
especially local councils, which were given statutory authority to
pollute. The breach of private rights in the name of public interest
was a pervasive and insidious form of government intervention, but
the ACA worked through the Parliamentary process to challenge the
authority. Despite pollution being made a criminal offence in 1876,
it was not until part II of the Control of Pollution Act (1974) came
into effect in the mid-1980s that regulation really began to tackle
pollution with any effect. The era of government listening most to
producer interests did not effectively end until 1989, with privatisa-
tion. From then on, consumer interest groups (if not consumers
themselves) were those most dominant in establishing government
policy.
The ACA's lobbying activity was also effective. Working within
its specific brief to establish and maintain clean rivers, the ACA be-
came a successful environmental watchdog long before the major
environmental groups were formed. Had it not been for ACA lobby-
ing, government Acts between 1951 and 1985 would have protected
some nationalised industries from all liability for pollution. It is ex-
tremely doubtful that government, national or local, would have pre-
vented gross pollution of English and Welsh rivers.
Modern environmental organisations have grown to resemble the
large corporations that they attack. They rely on orchestrated public-
ity events to raise donations to support their massive administration.
They lobby support from large donors and have all but forgotten the
individual supporter on whom the movements were founded. The
ACA, which has never had more than six employees, has thankfully
been spared the temptation to abandon its basic interests.
In the fifty years since the prescient John Eastwood founded the
ACA, the various solicitors and barristers acting on behalf of its
members have probably had over 2,000 cases of pollution referred to
them. About 40% of the cases involved local authorities or compa-
nies operating with statutory authority. Private companies were po-
tential defendants in 47% of the cases, about 7% were farmers and
there is a small miscellaneous remainder. 920 cases have been col-
lated so far by the author in an ever-expanding database and many
more will be added over the coming years.
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From the author's database, 83 there are 34 recorded injunctions
(most before 1966) and damages and costs totalling considerably
more than £1 million against defendants (a much greater amount in
real terms). Once anglers' rights were established, few cases brought
direct challenges. As the defendant's lawyers became aware of the
strength of the ACA case, most disputes were settled out of court.
Large, undisclosed settlements were being achieved from the late
1960s onwards. There are probably far more injunctions, court or-
ders, and verbal agreements made than this author has been able to
unearth. Furthermore, the settlements are probably nearer £10 mil-
lion (at least $50 million) because settlements often remain undis-
closed, since most defendants wish to keep their names out of the
press. In its history, the ACA has lost only three court actions.
Most of the cases never reached the courts and of those only a
handful were ever reported in law reports/journals, a few of those
mentioned above being the exceptions. Legal representatives for the
ACA became adept at negotiating settlements by the threat of action.
Now, a team of three lawyers (one working full-time for the ACA)
and an ACA staff of four (who also work on membership and other
matters) are able to maintain an average of 40 cases a year, a re-
markable achievement of efficiency and simplicity.
The ACA campaigns against pollution, not against particular pol-
luters. Nor does it try to rally public opinion to force changes
through Parliament; it simply protects the civil rights that the com-
mon man has in his property. This thoroughly single-minded cam-
paign against pollution has probably been the most successful that
Britain, and possibly any nation, has seen from a voluntary organisa-
tion.
There were over 1.1 million anglers registered in England and
Wales in 1998 (and over 500,000 when the ACA was formed). This
is a massive user base from which to draw support, and an ever-
vigilant membership to spot pollution. It is unlikely that any other
interest group would have as many potential members with a similar
goal (although the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds claims a
million members).
Part of the success of the ACA is that it relies on a system of law
where the individual's rights are narrowly defined and can be strictly
upheld. ACA actions are, on the whole, not general citizen suits
against threats to the environment, but specific actions against indi-
83. On file with the author.
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vidual polluters, brought by people with strong claims and legal
standing. Any country with similar common rights could use the
ACA methods as a template to exercise individual rights in the envi-
ronment.
84
WHAT SHOULD ACA Do IN THE FUTURE?
When the ACA started out there was little public or governmental
sympathy with its aims. Even now that we are all environmentalists,
anglers' interests still do not coincide exactly with the mainstream
view. Anglers want clean rivers because they support fish - other
benefits are incidental - and it is this narrow definition of interests
and protection of rights in those interests that give the ACA its
strength.
The ACA's success has come from its defence of civil rights, and
in urging individuals and cooperatives (clubs) to acquire property
rights in the environment in which they pursue their leisure interests.
Political 'ownership' of the environment in the past has led to envi-
ronmental degradation and pollution. There is now serious political
interest in environmental protection, however a successful outcome
is far from certain. The government has tried several times to over-
ride the common law interests with new policies designed to protect
the environment, and each time those policies have been found inef-
fectual. By contrast, the system of protection of property rights in the
civil courts has shown itself to be beneficial, efficient, flexible, and
equitable.
Several Acts of Parliament since 1963 have tried and failed to es-
tablish instream flow requirements for each river.85 Without levels
being established, discharge and abstraction consents always run the
risk of harming the environment. The result is that, even today, when
environmental interests dominate in water legislation formulation,
common law is still required to protect the fish and the water in
which they live. The common law says that it is the duty of the dis-
charger to ensure that the receiving environment can dilute his efflu-
ent without causing pollution. This is a simple test which encom-
passes all circumstances and provides certainty for all water users.
84. See generally CLAY LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS (Political
Economy Research Center 1998).
85. See generally CARTY & PAYNE supra note 6.
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The ACA will concentrate on maintaining individual rights and re-
stricting the powers that the Environment Agency has over rivers.
For example, the ACA might take advantage of the proposed
changes in legislation to allow it to purchase water abstraction li-
cences (perhaps from farmers) to ensure that the water they need
stays within the streams. Ownership of the environment is the best
way to ensure that it is protected. In the same way that the ACA
guarantee fund helped fight pollution, perhaps an instream flow fund
could be established to work to the model established by angling and
environmental groups in the Western United States.

